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JUDGING THE SCHIAVO CASE 
Samuel R. Bagenstos* 
I don't share the anti-abortion politics of the most vocal 
supporters of Theresa Schiavo's parents, Robert and Mary 
Schindler. Nor do I agree with the intemperate attacks visited on 
the courts following the rejection of the Schindlers' federal law-
suit. But I do think that the manner in which the federal courts 
handled the case offers cause for regret. The federal courts 
rushed the case, and in so doing, failed to provide meaningful 
consideration to the Schindlers' non-frivolous claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act {ADA). The state court ordered 
Schiavo's feeding and hydration terminated for reasons that had 
everything to do with her medical condition-a condition that is 
clearly a "disability" under the ADA. Although there may be 
good arguments that the state court did not violate the statute, 
the federal courts did not so much as advert to those arguments. 
And the case touched on a core concern of many disability rights 
advocates: the fear that non-disabled people, relying on errone-
ous understandings of the "quality of life" of people with dis-
abilities, will unjustifiably terminate life-sustaining treatment. 
Given that background, the federal courts should have taken the 
time to give the Schindlers' ADA claim at least some serious 
consideration. 
It is certainly understandable that the federal judges as-
signed to the case wanted to rush things. By the time the case got 
to federal court, the state courts had considered the matter with 
care and deliberation through six years of contested litigation. 
There was no particular reason to believe that the state courts 
had overlooked something or that federal court intervention was 
necessary. But it was not up to the federal courts to decide that 
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question. Congress had explicitly directed them to address and 
resolve the Schindlers' claims de novo, notwithstanding any state 
court proceedings that came before. Federal judges might under-
standably have been put off by the way the statute singled out a 
particular case, the lack of meaningful congressional deliberation 
in the highly charged atmosphere in which the statute was 
adopted, and the attempts by many politicians to use the courts 
(as weapons or targets) in a political battle. But neither the dis-
trict judge nor any of the judges on the three-judge appellate 
panel assigned to the case was willing to conclude that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional. In the absence of such a ruling, the 
federal courts should have given the parties and themselves 
enough time to give meaningful consideration to the Schindlers' 
claims. 
I. THE RUSH TO JUDGMENT 
When President Bush signed Public Law 109-31 at 1:11 A.M. 
on March 21, 2005, the feeding and hydration tubes had already 
been removed from Theresa Schiavo pursuant to the state 
court's order. For those who sought to keep Schiavo alive, time 
was of the essence. The Schindlers filed their initial complaint 
that morning, along with a request for a temporary restraining 
order to reinsert the tubes. The district court held a hearing on 
the TRO request that afternoon and denied the motion in an 
opinion issued the next morning, March 22.2 
It's hard to disagree with the district court's denial of the 
initial request for a temporary restraining order. To be sure, the 
balance of hardships clearly favored a TRO: Denial would al-
most certainly lead to Schiavo's death whereas granting the 
TRO would merely continue, for some indefinite period of time, 
the artificial feeding and hydration that Schiavo had been receiv-
ing for fifteen years. But under ordinary rules governing inter-
locutory relief-rules Congress pointedly did not change in Pub-
lic Law 109-33 -a favorable balance of hardships is not enough. 
The plaintiff must also show at least some meaningful prospect 
1. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
2 See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
3. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam) (showing that "Congress considered and specifically rejected provisions that 
would have mandated, or permitted with favorable implications, the grant of the pretrial 
stay"). 
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of success on the merits. The claims in the first complaint were 
frivolous.4 
The Schindlers immediately filed a notice of appeal, and 
that same day-which was just one day after they filed their 
complaint initiating the federal case- they filed an amended 
complaint, containing several new causes of action, in the district 
court. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the temporary 
restraining order by a 2-1 panel vote on the 23rd,5 and the 
Schindlers filed a renewed motion for TRO the next day, March 
24. The district court held a hearing on the renewed motion that 
evening, from 6:30 to 9:40 P.M., and issued its opinion denying 
the motion the next morning.6 As it had three days earlier, the 
district court recognized that the balance of hardships tipped 
strongly in favor of the plaintiffs, but it again found no sufficient 
likelihood that they would succeed on the merits.7 
A. THE (UNAPPRECIATED) COMPLEXITY 
OF THE ADA CLAIM 
It is here that I think the district court slipped. Along with 
several counts that were just as insubstantial as those in the 
original complaint, the amended complaint included a cause of 
action under the ADA.8 That claim was far from frivolous. There 
is no doubt that Theresa Schiavo was an "individual with a dis-
ability" under the statute-her medical condition, which had left 
her unconscious for fifteen years, clearly constituted a "physical 
or mental imi?airment that substantially limit[ed]" her "major 
life activities. "9 And that medical condition was the sole reason 
the state courts concluded that she would not choose to receive 
further feeding and hydration.10 At least on the face of things, 
4. This is not to say that the district court's analysis of those claims was without its 
flaws. In rejecting the Schindlers' claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act and the Free Exercise Oause of the First Amendment, the district court 
rested entirely on its conclusion that the state court judge was not operating as a state 
actor when he ordered the termination of Schiavo's feeding and hydration. See Schiavo, 
357 F. Supp. 2d at 1388. For reasons I discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes 
52-55, that conclusion was clearly wrong-and almost surely a product of the court's un-
due haste. 
5. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1229. 
6. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
7. See id. at 1163-64. 
8. See id. at 1164-65. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) 
10. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176,180 (Fla. 0. App. 2001) 
("In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was whether 
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in 
a persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but the 
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those facts would seem to establish that Schiavo experienced 
discrimination "by reason of [her] disability" or "on the basis of 
[her] disability" in violation of the ADA.11 
To be sure, the issue is complicated. The Schindlers filed 
their suit against three defendants: Michael Schiavo (Theresa's 
husband), Judge George Greer (the state court judge who en-
tered the order terminating feeding and hydration), and the 
Hospice of Florida Suncoast (where Theresa Schiavo was living 
at the time of the order). Of these three defendants, it is quite 
unlikely that Michael Schiavo or the Hospice violated the ADA. 
To the extent that the complaint challenged the conduct of Mi-
chael Schiavo, that conduct occurred in his capacity as an indi-
vidual, private citizen-not as an employer, government entity, 
or place of public accommodation, which are the types of entities 
covered by the AD A.12 The Hospice clearly is covered by the 
AD A as a place of public accommodation, 13 but it seems to have 
operated purely neutrally here. When the state court ordered the 
tube removed, the Hospice did so, and when the state court or-
dered the tube reinserted, the Hospice did so.14 The Hospice thus 
appears to have acted on the basis of the state court's order, not 
Schiavo's disability.15 
As for Judge Greer, he was operating as a state actor at the 
time he ordered that Schiavo's feeding and hydration be termi-
nated. He, or at least the court on which he served and for which 
he acted, was a "public entity" subject to the antidiscrimination 
requirements of ADA Title Il.16 But there are still a number of 
most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a medical cure but with suffi-
cient money and strength of body to live indefinitely, would choose to continue the con-
stant nursing care and the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow rec-
reate her missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural death 
process to take its course and for her family members and loved ones to be free to con-
tinue their lives. After due consideration, we conclude that the trial judge had clear and 
convincing evidence to answer this question as he did."). 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182(a). 
12 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182. 
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (public accommodation includes a "professional 
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment"). 
14. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1165. 
15. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion) ("A hospital's withholding of treatment [from an infant with a disability) when no 
parental consent has been given cannot violate§ 504 J<?f the Rehab~tation.Act): for 
without the consent of the parents or a surrogate deru10nmaker the infant IS neither 
'otherwise qualified' for treatment nor has he been denied care 'solely by reason of his 
handicap."'). The Rehabilitation Act is the predecessor statute to the ADA, and ADA 
law generally incorporates the substantive principles applied under that statute. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12201(a); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,631-32 (1998). 
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132. 
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complications. First, one might argue that just as the Hospice 
acted purely neutrally in implementing Judge Greer's order, 
Judge Greer acted purely neutrally in implementing Theresa 
Schiavo's wishes, as best he could determine them. Second, even 
if the decision to terminate feeding and hydration can be laid at 
Judge Greer's feet, a line of lower-court "Baby Doe" cases holds 
that the disability discrimination laws do not apply to decisions 
to withhold medical treatment-at least where the plaintiff's dis-
ability is the reason why the plaintiff needs medical treatment in 
the first place.17 These cases rest on a conclusion that Congress 
never envisioned that the disability discrimination laws would 
apply to medical treatment decisions/8 as well as on a formal dis-
crimination principle that would suggest that Schiavo's claim 
lacks merit: If her disability was the only reason Schiavo needed 
a tube to provide food and hydration in the first place, then the 
failure to provide her such a tube does not discriminate on the 
basis of disability because there are no similarly situated non-
disabled people who were provided the tube.19 Third, even if, 
notwithstanding that precedent, Judge Greer did discriminate on 
the basis of disability, perhaps Schiavo was not a "qualified" in-
dividual with a disability as required for statutory protection.20 If 
a legitimate medical judgment underlay the decision to withhold 
feeding and hydration, one might say that she failed to "meetO 
the essential eligibility requirements" for receipt of that treat-
ment.21 
But these arguments are not obviously right. Indeed, there 
are powerful (although not necessarily dispositive) answers to 
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("Such a 
plaintiff must prove that he or she was discriminatorily denied medical treatment because 
of the birth defect and, at the same time, must prove that, in spite of the birth defect, he 
or she was 'otherwise qualified' to receive the denied medical treatment. Ordinarily, 
however, if such a person were not so handicapped, he or she would not need the medical 
treatment and thus would not 'otherwise qualify' for the treatment."); United States v. 
University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (1984) (concluding that Section 
504 "cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions 
without distorting its plain meaning" because "one would not ordinarily think of a new-
born infant suffering from multiple birth defects as being 'otherwise qualified' to have 
corrective surgery performed"). But see id. at 162-63 (Winter, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that Section 504 does prohibit denial of medical treatment newborns need because of 
their disabilities in some circumstances). 
18. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-59. 
19. See Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1494; University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156. 
20. 42 u.s.c. § 12132. 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"); see Uni-
versity Hosp., 729 F.Zd at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 504 prohibits 
discriminatory failure to treat newborns with disabilities but acknowledging that no dis-
crimination exists if the refusal to treat rests on "a bona fide medical judgment"). 
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them. The argument that Judge Greer simply neutrally imple-
mented Theresa Schiavo's preferences seems a bit artificial. 
Judge Greer was called upon to decide what Theresa Schiavo 
would have wanted.12 As the state appellate court observed, he 
was called upon to do so on the basis of very little evidence: "She 
had been raised in the Catholic faith, but did not regularly attend 
mass or have a religious advisor who could assist the court in 
weighing her religious attitudes about life-support methods. Her 
statements to her friends and family about the dying process 
were few and they were oral."23 It was Judge Greer's judgment-
and not Theresa Schiavo's-that she would not have wanted to 
continue to receive food and hydration given how severe her 
medical condition was. In making that judgment, he relied not 
just on Schiavo's few (somewhat conflicting) statements about 
the issue, but also, at least to some extent, on general testimony 
about Americans' "values, opinions, and attitudes about the de-
cision to discontinue life-support systems."24 Judge Greer may 
well have been correct, but it was he who made the decision. 
This is not to say that Judge Greer lacked the legal power to 
make that decision. If we respect individuals' autonomy in refus-
ing treatment, we need some system for determining what to do 
with individuals who cannot make that choice at the time treat-
ment decisions must be made. A regime that requires a judge to 
determine what the individual would have wanted, based on the 
best available evidence, could reasonably be thought to be more 
respectful of autonomy than one that simply imposes a rule of 
treatment or non-treatment across the board without reference 
to what we know about an individual's preferences. If that is so, 
then perhaps it makes sense as a legal matter to treat Judge 
Greer's decision that Schiavo would not have consented to con-
tinued treatment as equivalent to a decision by Schiavo herself 
to refuse treatment. 
But things are not so simple. To say that a state judge can 
insulate from review a decision to withhold a patient's treatment 
simply by deciding that the patient would have wanted to with-
22 See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003) 
("[T)he trial judge must make a decision that the clear and convincing evidence shows 
the ward would have made for herself."). 
23. Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 180. 
24. Id. at 179; see Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. 9-10 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. 2000) ("[A)s Ms. Tyler noted when she testified as to quality of life being the 
primary criteria [sic) in artificial life support matters, Americans want to 'try it ~o_r 
awhile' but they do not wish to live on it with no hope of improvement. That unplictt 
condition has long since been satisfied in this case."). 
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hold treatment begs the question. The decision about what the 
patient would have wanted may well be influenced by (perhaps 
unconscious) bias against disability. It is commonplace that non-
disabled people entertain much more negative views about the 
quality and desirability of living life with a disability than do 
people with disabilities themselves.25 If a state judge, in the 
course of deciding what an incompetent patient "would have 
wanted," relies on such biased assessments, it is reasonable to 
treat the judge's decision as itself discriminatory. Such a decision 
calls for scrutiny under the disability discrimination laws, and a 
judge ought not be able to shield his or her decision from such 
scrutiny simply by deeming the decision to be an exercise of the 
incompetent patient's choice. 
The argument based on the "Baby Doe" cases is also prob-
lematic for at least two reasons. First, the "Baby Doe" cases 
have been substantially undermined by more recent Supreme 
Court decisions. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. 
Yeskey,26 the Court emphatically rejected the notion-which was 
central to the "Baby Doe" cases-that the ADA applies only to 
those contexts expressly anticipated by Congress. The ADA's 
broad language extends without limitation to any disability-
based discrimination by any "public entity,"27 and Yeskey ac-
cords the statute a correspondingly broad sweep.28 Whether or 
not Congress specifically intended to apply the ADA to medical 
treatment decisions by public entities, the statute, after Yeskey, 
clearly does apply to those decisions. 
It is also doubtful that the formal discrimination analysis of 
the "Baby Doe" cases survives the Supreme Court's decision in 
Olmstead v. L.C.29 In Olmstead, the Court held that discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability includes the unnecessary placement 
in institutional settings, rather than community settings, of indi-
viduals with disabilities who receive state mental health care. 
The state argued that its failure to create community placements 
25. See, e.g., Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disabilities, and Assisted Suicide: 
An Examination of Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PsYCHOL., PuB. 
POL'Y & L. 526, 528-30 (2000) (summarizing empirical evidence on this question). 
26. 524 u.s. 206 (1998). 
27. 42 u.s.c. § 12132. 
28. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (holding that, even if "Congress did not envision 
that the ADA would be applied to state prisoners," the statute still applied to them be-
cause "the fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by 
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity" but instead "demonstrates breadth") (inter-
nal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
29. 527 u.s. 581 (1999). 
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for people with mental illness could not constitute "discrimina-
tion" on the basis of disability because it did not provide com-
munity-based treatment to individuals who lacked disabilities.30 
But the Court rejected that argument and concluded that "Con-
gress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimi-
nation advanced in the ADA."31 If the failure to provide appro-
priate community-based treatment to people with disabilities 
constitutes "discrimination" -even when the disabilities are the 
reason treatment is needed in the first place and even when 
community-based treatment is not provided to people without 
disabilities-the "Baby Doe" holding that the ADA does not 
apply to medical treatment decisions stands on very shaky 
ground.32 
Second, even if the formal discrimination analysis of the 
"Baby Doe" cases were still good law, there seems to be a clear 
instance of formal discrimination here. The court ordered with-
drawal of the feeding and hydration tubes because of the sever-
ity of Theresa Schiavo's medical condition. If she had needed 
those tubes only temporarily, because of a passing, non-disabling 
condition, Judge Greer would not have ordered that the tubes be 
withdrawn.33 It was the disabling nature of Schiavo's condition 
that tilted the balance. 
The "qualified individual" issue was in some ways the most 
difficult for the Schindlers. It's clear that a doctor can take a pa-
tient's medical condition into account in making a medical deci-
sion; that's the essence of a doctor's job. And there's no reason 
why things should be different when the patient's medical condi-
tion constitutes a "disability" under the ADA. If a condition that 
constitutes a "disability" can be mitigated or cured most effec-
tively by a different treatment than that administered for a dif-
ferent, non-"disabling" condition, it would not make sense to say 
that the doctor must ignore the disability and provide the less ef-
fective treatment. Still, the Schiavo case does not quite fit that 
paradigm. There seems no doubt that continued feeding and hy-
dration would have kept Theresa Schiavo alive. The only ques-
tion was essentially a normative one: Did it make sense, given 
30. See id. at 598. 
31. /d. 
32. For further criticism of the analysis of the "Baby Doe" cases, see, for example, 
Philip G. Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability 
Rights Laws, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 798, 81S-25 (1997). 
33. See Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. 8 (noting that Flor-
ida law prohibits exercise of substitute judgment if the patient has "a reasonable prob-
ability of recovering competency") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the persistent vegetative state in which Schiavo was living and 
the lack of any realistic prospect of improvement, to keep her 
alive? Disability rights advocates have long argued, with consid-
erable force, that such quality-of-life judgments often reflect an 
irrational bias against people with disabilities and an assumption 
that lives with disabilities are less worthwhile.34 When, as in the 
Schiavo case, disability-related quality-of-life concerns drive a 
decision to withhold a treatment that would clearly be effective 
in its narrow medical objective, it does not seem at all a stretch 
to find a violation of the ADA.35 
None of this is to say that the ADA claim was obviously 
meritorious. The arguments discussed above su~est, to the con-
trary, that the case was a close one either way. In particular, it 
seems unlikely that the statute would be held to require a state 
to keep alive a person who has lost all consciousness and cogni-
tion and who has no prospect of regaining them.37 But one phe-
nomenon to which the ADA responds is the tendency to believe 
that disabilities are more limiting than they in fact are.38 In the 
medical context, that tendency has frequently manifested itself 
in physicians' decisions to withhold treatment based on unduly 
negative predictions about the quality and length of disabled 
persons' lives.39 Against that backdrop, it is quite plausible to 
read the ADA as demanding a skeptical review of a claim that 
an individual's disability makes treatment futile. It should thus 
34. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 25, passim. This point was a major theme of some dis-
ability-rights oriented commentary on the Schiavo case. See, e.g., Harriet McBryde John-
son, Not Dead at All: Why Congress was Right to Stick Up for Te"i Schiavo, SLATE, Mar. 
23, 2005, available at http:l/slate.msn.com/id/2115208. For general discussions of the 
problem see, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as 
Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479, 1507-08 (2001); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health 
Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 501 (1995). 
35. For a discussion of relevant legal arguments, see Mary A. Crossley, Medical Fu-
tility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REv. 179, 220-26 (1995); see also Einer 
Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1514-15 (1994) (arguing, 
from a normative rather than a doctrinal perspective, that wrongful discrimination exists 
in the refusal to give a medical treatment to an individual because that individual has a 
condition that is not the target of the treatment). 
36. Cf. Crossley, supra note 35, at 182 (finding "inconclusiveO" the legal arguments 
regarding whether it violates the disability discrimination laws to withhold treatment 
from an individual with a disability based on medical futility). 
37. For an argument that the disability discrimination laws should not be read to 
impose any such requirement, see Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Ap-
proach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1092-95 (1997). 
38. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. 
L. REV. 397, 438 (2000). 
39. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGIITS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CHILDREN WITII DISABILITIES (1989); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CiviL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 273-79 (1993). 
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have been significant to the federal courts that the Schindlers 
vigorously contested Schiavo's persistent-vegetative-state diag-
nosis. As I discuss below, however, those courts did not even ad-
dress that factual dispute. 
B. UNDUE HASTE 
The issues, then, were complicated. But the federal courts 
did not appear even to notice any of these complexities. Rather, 
just three days after the Schindlers filed the amended complaint 
that contained the ADA claim, and just one day after the 
Schindlers filed their renewed TRO motion in light of that and 
the other new claims, the district court ruled that there was no 
realistic likelihood of success.40 Given the speed with which it 
rendered its opinion, it is not surprising that the district court 
made some obvious mistakes. The court simply ignored the fact 
that the Schindlers had named Judge Greer as a defendant in the 
ADA claim; it discussed the potential liability of only Michael 
Schiavo and the Hospice.41 And in rejecting the possibility that 
the Hospice might be liable, the court ruled that the ADA's 
"public accommodation" definition "does not include a facility 
such as Hospice. "42 That ruling disregards the statutory language, 
which states that a "public accommodation" includes a "profes-
sional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment. "43 
But more important than these mistakes, which are sure 
signs of a rush job, the district court did not seem at all to under-
stand the complex issues raised by the ADA claim. The court 
held that "Theresa Schiavo is not 'otherwise qualified' because 
she would not have any need for a feeding tube to deliver nutri-
tion and hydration but for her medical condition. "44 It relied 
solely on two pre-Yeskey, pre-Olmstead cases-the leading 
"Baby Doe" case of United States v. University Hospital of State 
University of New York at Stony Brook45 and a subsequent Sev-
enth Circuit decision that itself relied almost entirely on Univer-
40. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65. 
41. See id. 
42 Id. at 1165. 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
44. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. This quote appears in the portion of the dis· 
trict court's opinion that addresses the claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
but the analysis applies equally well to the ADA claim. 
45. 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984). 
2005] JUDGING THE SCHIAVO CASE 467 
sity Hospital and another "Baby Doe" case46 -which held that 
the disability discrimination laws "cannot be meaningfully ap-
plied to a medical treatment decision. "47 The court cited 
Olmstead-ironically, for the proposition that the disability dis-
crimination laws "do[] not mandate the provision of services"48 -
but it did not even begin to recognize that Olmstead's holding 
might undercut the "Baby Doe" cases on which it placed such 
heavy reliance. The Court did not mention Yeskey at all. 
Later on March 25-the same day the district court ruled-
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the renewed motion 
for a TR0.49 The court of appeals corrected some of the district 
court's errors: Unlike the district court, it acknowledged that the 
Schindlers had named Judge Greer a defendant on their ADA 
claim,50 and it did not repeat the district court's erroneous con-
clusion that the Hospice was not a "public accommodation."51 
But the court of appeals introduced errors of its own. Most no-
tably, the court held that Judge Greer was not operating as a 
state actor when, acting in his official capacity, he ordered the 
termination of feeding and hydration to Theresa Schiavo.52 That 
holding seems, on its face, to be inconsistent with Shelley v. 
Kraemer.53 The court of appeals relied on an earlier Eleventh 
Circuit case that had held that a state judge does not commit 
unlawful state action merely by entertaining a suit that one pri-
vate party brought for unlawful purposes against another private 
party.54 But that earlier case had expressly recognized that state 
action should be "found after a final judgment or otherwise dis-
positive order on the merits had been rendered by the state 
court"55 -the precise fact setting of the Schiavo case. 
Moreover, in affirming the district court's denial of the re-
newed motion for a TRO the Eleventh Circuit uncritically relied 
46. Grzan v. Chaner Hosp., 104 F.3d 116, 121-22 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing University 
Hosp., supra; Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493-94 (lOth Cir. 1992), cen. denied, 
5fJ7 u.s. 910 (1993)). 
47. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. 
49. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (per cu-
riam). 
50. See id. at 1293 n.2. 
51. See id. at 1293-94 (assuming arguendo that the Hospice was a "public accom-
modation"). 
52 See id. at 1293 n.2. 
53. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
54. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1293 n.2 (citing Paisley v. Vitale, 8fJ7 F.2d 889, 893-94 
(11th Cir. 1986) ). 
55. Paisley, 8(]7 F.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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on the "Baby Doe" cases to rule that the disability discrimina-
tion laws were "never intended to apply to decisions involving 
the termination of life support or medical treatment. "56 Like the 
district court, the court of appeals did not appear to recognize 
that Olmstead or Yeskey might undermine the continuing force 
of those cases. Indeed, unlike the district court, the court of ap-
peals never even cited Olmstead. 
The March 25 decision was the Eleventh Circuit's last word 
on the merits of the Schiavo appeal. The court denied en bane 
rehearing five days later.57 It did so over the dissent of Judge 
Tjoflat, joined by Judge Wilson, who warned that "the hurried 
pace of this litigation" had prevented the court from "giv[ingJ 
the plaintiffs' claims the reasoned attention they deserve." 
Theresa Schiavo died the next day, March 31. 
Significantly, the federal courts never addressed the crucial 
factual question regarding the extent of Schiavo's impairment. 
Although the Florida courts concluded that Schiavo was in a 
persistent vegetative state,59 and Schiavo's subsequent autopsy 
seems clearly to confirm that conclusion,60 the accelerated pro-
ceedings prevented the federal courts from conducting their own 
de novo review of that question as Public Law 109-3 required.61 
Indeed, the district court did not discuss the issue at all, nor did 
the appellate panel. The two judges in the panel majority did 
briefly discuss the facts in their concurrence in the denial of re-
hearing en bane, but they addressed only the question of what 
Schiavo would have wanted; they did not address the medical 
dispute. Even so, the judges pointedly declined to engage in de 
novo review of the state court findings: "Given the credibility 
determinations that the state trial court was authorized to and 
did make, the evidence clearly was sufficient to meet the clear 
and convincing evidence standard, which the Florida courts had 
imposed and did apply in this case. "62 
56. Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1294 (citing University Hosp., supra; Johnson, supra). The 
court also relied on Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Qr. 1996), a pre-Yeskey, 
pre-Olmstead case that held that the ADA is not "violated by a prison's simply failing to 
attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners." 
57. See Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). 
58. Id. at 1279 (fjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). 
59. See Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d at 185, 186. 
60. See, e.g., John-Thor Dahlburg & Karen Kaplan, Autopsy Says Schiavo was 
Oblivious to Surroundings, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9518169. 
61. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2. 
62 Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1279 (Carnes and Hull, JJ., concurring in denial ofrehear-
ing en bane). 
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II. WHYTHERUSH? 
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The ADA claim was before the federal courts for a total of 
three days before those courts issued their dispositive opinions. 
And the district court and the three-judge appellate panel each 
entertained the TRO request involving that claim for only a mat-
ter of hours. Although the issues were complex and contested, 
the federal courts felt sufficiently confident that the claim had no 
merit that they refused to issue even a brief temporary restrain-
ing order to keep Theresa Schiavo alive while they considered it. 
As I have shown, their haste led to some obvious errors, and the 
federal courts failed to grapple with-or even advert to-the dif-
ficult issues raised by the ADA claim. 
Why did the federal courts move the proceedings so 
quickly? As Herman Badillo said when state troopers stormed 
Attica prison on September 13, 1971, "[t]here's always time to 
die. I don't know what the rush was. "63 The federal courts would 
not even have had to allow the litigation to follow the normal 
timetable, with full discovery and a trial (a process the Eleventh 
Circuit panel majority predicted would take "many months, if 
not longer"64). The district court could have granted a brief TRO 
and set a hearing a week or two later on a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction. Such a brief delay would have given the district 
court a chance to seriously think about the issues in the case. If, 
after the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the court con-
cluded that there really was no prospect of success, it could have 
permitted Schiavo's feeding and hydration to be terminated 
then. All that would have been lost was a couple of weeks. 
But the district court did not grant even such a brief delay. 
The explanation cannot be that the legal issues were obvious or 
easy. I hope I have shown that they were not, though perhaps 
the lawyers did not frame them in the manner that would have 
been the most helpful to the Schindlers or the courts. Rather, the 
most obvious explanation is that the federal judges assigned to 
the case perceived the equities as strongly tilting in favor of end-
ing the litigation as soon as possible. The state courts, after all, 
had considered the case with extraordinary care-to the point of 
bending over backwards to entertain and carefully review the 
Schindlers' request to reopen the case and present new evi-
dence.65 There was no particular reason to believe that the 
63. TOM WICKER, A 11ME TO DIE 286 (1975) (quoting Badillo). 
64. Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1226 n.4. 
65. The Florida Circuit Court entered its original opinion directing the withholding 
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Schindlers could present the federal courts with any probative 
evidence or argument that the Florida courts had not exhaus-
tively addressed. Given the history of the state-court litigation, 
the words of the Florida trial judge must have weighed heavily 
on the federal judges: 
Five years have passed since the issuance of the February 
2000 Order authorizing the removal of Theresa Schiavo's nu-
trition and hydration and there appears to be no finality in 
sight to this process. The Court, therefore, is no longer com-
fortable in continuing to grant stays pending appeal of Orders 
denying Respondents' various motions and petitions. The 
process does not work when the trial court finds a motion to 
be without merit but then stays the effect of such denial for 
months pending appellate review. Also, the Court is no longer 
comfortable granting stays simply upon the filing of new mo-
of feeding and hydration on February 11, 2000, after hearing evidence from the 
Schindlers. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. a., Feb. 11, 
2000). The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, based on the re-
cord before the circuit court, on January 24, 2001. See Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 
2d at 180. On April 24, 2001, after the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary re-
view, Schiavo's feeding and hydration were discontinued. See In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. a. App. 2001). But the Schindlers filed a motion for 
relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence two days later. See id. On July 
11, 2001, the Florida Court of Appeals directed the trial court to entertain that motion 
for relief from judgment, and it denied Michael Schiavo's motion to enforce its earlier 
mandate. See id. at 554. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, but 
the Florida Court of Appeals reversed. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640 
(Fla. a. App. 2001). In an opinion entered on October 17, 2001, the appellate court ex-
pressed "skepticism" about the new evidence proffered by the Schindlers, id. at 644, but 
it nonetheless held that the trial court must "permit certain limited discovery and con-
duct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the new evidence calls into question 
the trial court's earlier decision," id. at 642. On remand, the trial court permitted discov-
ery for almost a year and conducted a hearing at which it entertained testimony from six 
physicians-Schiavo's treating physician, two experts chosen by Michael Schiavo, two 
experts chosen by the Schindlers, and one expert chosen by the court-and reviewed ad-
ditional documentary evidence. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960 at 
*1 (Fla. Cir. a., Nov. 22, 2002). After exhaustively considering the new evidence, the 
trial court refused to alter its original judgment. See id. at *2-*5. The Florida District 
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on June 6, 2003. See In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. a. App. 2003). Although the Florida appellate courts re-
view the denial of a motion for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion, the Florida 
District Court of Appeals "closely examined all of the evidence in th[e) record" and 
"concluded that, if we were called upon to review the guardianship court's decision de 
novo, we would still affirm it." Id. at 186. After the Florida Supreme Court invalidated, 
on state constitutional grounds, a statute the legislature had adopted that permitted the 
Governor to issue a stay of the order to terminate Schiavo's feeding and hydration, see 
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), the Schindlers filed a new motion for relief 
from the original circuit court judgment, which the trial and appellate courts denied, see 
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. a. App. 2005). 
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tions and petitions since there will always be "new" issues that 
can be pled. 66 
471 
The Schindlers' federal court suit thus had all the hallmarks of 
an eleventh-hour habeas petition filed by a death-row inmate, a 
petition filed merely for delay, with no realistic hope of success.67 
And the fact that the ADA claim was not raised until the 
Schindlers' amended complaint (albeit one filed only a day after 
the original complaint) must have added to the sense of dilatori-
ness. 
But however impressed the federal judges were with the 
care and deliberation of the state courts-and however much 
they thought the Schindlers filed their federal suit merely for de-
lay-Congress specifically directed the federal courts to "deter-
mine de novo any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa 
Marie Schiavo" and to do so "notwithstanding any prior State 
court determination. "68 Respect for Congress thus required the 
federal courts to decline to accord weight to the prior state court 
proceedings. 
The federal judges may not have felt terribly inclined to re-
spect Congress in this case. The enactment of Public Law 109-3 
does not appear as Congress's finest hour. The statute disre-
garded the results of the careful state-court proceedings and re-
quired extraordinary federal-court review of a single case with-
out any particular reason to believe that the case was any 
different from thousands of other cases that did not arouse con-
gressional attention. Vocal advocates of the statute sought cyni-
cally to employ the Schiavos' and Schindlers' family tragedy as a 
political weapon, an effort highlighted by the notorious "talking 
points memorandum" that urged Republicans to use the Schiavo 
case to gain partisan advantage.69 The race to enact the statute 
also deprived Congress of any meaningful opportunity for delib-
eration. 
66. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 WL 459634 (Fla. Cir. a., Feb. 25, 2005). 
67. Cf Mark Tushnet, "The King of France with Forty Thousand Men": Felker v. 
Turpin and the Supreme Coun's Deliberative Processes, 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 163, 166--81 
(discussing pressures last-minute capital habeas petitions placed on Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking processes during the 1980s and early 1990s). On the harm to judicial deci-
sionmaking of a rush to judgment, see Michael Herz, The Supreme Coun in Real Time: 
Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 AKRON L. REv. 185 (2002). 
68. Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2. 
69. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Counsel to GOP Senator Wrote Memo on Schiavo: Mani-
nez Aide Who Cited Upside for Pany Resigns, WASH. POST., Apr. 7, 2005, at Al. 
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Whether or not a law deserves respect as "good legislation," 
the courts have a duty to apply that law unless they conclude 
that it is unconstitutional. Notably, neither the district judge nor 
any of the three judges on the appellate panel assigned to the 
case were willing to reach such a conclusion. Failing a determi-
nation that the statute was unconstitutional, the district court 
and the appellate panel had an obligation to implement the stat-
ute's directive to consider matters de novo, without regard to 
prior proceedings. 
Only one federal judge was willing to conclude that Public 
Law 109-3 was unconstitutional: Judge Birch, in his opinion con-
curring in the Eleventh Circuit's denial of en bane review.70 But 
he was not a member of the panel that issued the appellate 
court's judgment in the case. If the judges in the panel majority 
believed the statute to be unconstitutional, candor compelled 
them to say so.71 However, they said nothing on the subject. 
I do not contend that the ultimate result in the Schiavo case 
was wrong. My critique, rather, is a procedural one, one about 
70. See Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1271-76 (Birch, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
bane). Space limitations imposed by the editors prevent me from addressing Judge 
Birch's argument that the statute was unconstitutional. For present purposes, it should 
suffice to note that the issue is far more complex than Judge Birch suggested. Judge 
Birch contended that Public Law 109-3 violated the separation of powers by singling out 
a particular case and dictating various procedural rules to be applied in it-in particular, 
by requiring de novo review and eliminating defenses based on preclusion, waiver, ex-
haustion, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1273-75 & nn.4-5. But that argu-
ment stands in serious tension with the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v. Seattle 
Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), which upheld a statute that singled out two pend-
ing cases by name and docket number and dictated substantive rules that would apply to 
them, see id. at 434-35. The statute does resemble the colonial-era statutes in which legis-
latures singled out particular cases to "set aside the judgment and order a new trial or 
appeal." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). In Plaut, the Supreme 
Court held that Article III of the Constitution responded to the abuses of that system by 
prohibiting legislative interference with the final judgments of federal courts. See id. at 
219-25. But Article III does not protect state-court judgments, and Plaut specifically re-
served any due process issue. See id. at 217. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, 
notwithstanding Plaut, "[p)rospective relief under a continuing, executory decree re-
mains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law." Miller v. French, 530 
U.S. 327, 344 (2000). Under Florida law, the state-court order remained executory at the 
time Congress enacted the statute. See GIUUdianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 559 ("As 
long as the ward is alive, the order is subject to recall and is executory in nature."). This 
is not to say that the statute was obviously constitutional; Judge Birch was correct that 
the statute was "unprecedented in nature, and therefore a lack of controlling case law is 
unremarkable." Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1274 n.4. But that very "lack of controlling case 
law" should have inspired a bit more deliberation before racing to the conclusion that the 
statute was obviously unconstitutional. 
71. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 
731, 738 (1987) (arguing that "a great deal is lost in the process of debate if the reasons 
given by the judge to the public are inconsistent with those he would give in private, or to 
himself'). 
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the role of a judge in a case like this. Respect for the decision of 
a coordinate branch of government, and respect for the people 
to whom that branch is ultimately responsible, required the fed-
eral courts to take one of two paths: either conducting the de 
novo review Congress directed or forthrightly holding the statute 
unconstitutional. The federal courts chose neither path, and that 
is why I believe the Schiavo case is an occasion for regret. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Humility should prevent any of us from being too judg-
mental about the actions taken by the federal judges assigned to 
the Schiavo case. The cliche is apt: The judges were thrust into 
the center ring of a political and media circus. The judicial im-
pulse to stand up to the political pressure applied by the 
Schindlers and their allies in Congress and the right-to-life 
movement must have been powerful. The impulse to defend the 
work of the state courts-whose judges had been loudly and un-
justly attacked for their rulings in the casen -must have been es-
pecially powerful.73 
The final days of Theresa Schiavo's life imposed what must 
have been unbearable pressures on everyone involved. In the 
face of such pressure, it is the rare person who can get by with-
out doing anything he or she regrets. Unfortunately-or fortu-
nately-judges are people, too. The federal judges assigned to 
the Schiavo matter succumbed to the pressure to rush the case. 
That they did so is understandable, but it is regrettable. 
72 See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, In Courts, Threats Become Alarming Fact of Life, 
N.Y. nMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 1 ("George W. Greer, a state judge in Florida, has been the 
target of considerable invective and the recipient of voluminous hate mail and death 
threats for ordering the removal of a feeding tube from Ms. Schiavo. For weeks, sheriffs 
deputies have kept Judge Greer under close guard."). 
73. Also at work, I think, was the general disinclination of federal judges to hear 
cases that feel like "family law" cases. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
615-16 (2000); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-701 (1992). For criticism of 
that disinclination, see, for example, Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobby-
ing, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 
(2000); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.1682, 1749-50 (1991). 
